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HEARINGS ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
BEFORE SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER
August 24, 1981
STATEMENT OF ACTING CHAIRMAN J. CLAY SMITH, JR.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

J

I am J. Clay Smith, Jr., Acting Chairman of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a five-member
bipartisan Commission having principal responsibility for the
administration and enforcement of Federal laws prohibiting

-discrimination in employment,
including Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

Since the early days of our

existence as an agency, we have recognized that harassment in the
workplace, which is based on race, religion, national origin,
color, or sex,

constitu~es

a violation of Title VII because it

imposes an adverse term or condition of employment on one class
of people which is not imposed on any other classes of people.
It unfairly handicaps and disadvantages those people against whom
it is directed, often making it impossible for -them to perform
their jobs.

While the Commission continues to actively oppose

harassment in the workplace on any Title VII basis, I will limit
my testimony today to harassment on the basis of sex which takes
the form of sexual harassment.

That sexual.narassment is widespread is

~ot

to be denied.

According to Lin Farley, the author of Sexual Shakedown, uIn

~y

1975 the Women's Affairs Section of the Human Affairs Program at
'bute d
'
Cornell University· d ~str~

devoted solely to the

topi~

t h e f'~rst

.i.

quest~onna~re

ever

of sexual harassment ... 70 percent
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(of the respondents had) personally experienced some form of
harassment". 11

In 1976, Redbook magazine published a question-

naire on sexual harassment to which over 9,000 women responded.
Of this number, one in ten reported that they had experienced
unwanted sexual attentions on the job.2/

Additionally, a statis-

tically significant st,,;:dy conducted by the U. SO. Merit Systems
Protection Board shows that during the two years prior to the
survey, which was done in early 1980, 42 percent of .all federally
employed women

surveyed reported that they were victims of

se~ual harassment.~/

Also during the late 1970's cases involving

sexual harassment were decided in six Federal Circuit Courts and
seven additional cases were decided in Federal District Courts.

In addition to this activity in the courts, in 1979 the
Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on Post
Office and Civil Service held hearings on sexual harassment in
the

F~deral

government.

These hearings establi$hed that sexual

harassment was widespread in the Federal government and established
the need for guidance from our- Connnission with respect to this
issue.

The Commission realized, however, that any guidance which

was issued with respect to sexual harassment would necessarily
apply equally to all employers covered by Title VII, and we
further realized, from the activity in the couris, that both
public and private employers were in need of help,_: in understanding
and dE-fining their liability for acts of sexual harassment in
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the workplace- and were in need of help in determining how to
mitigate that liability.
guidelines should

b~

Therefore, the Commission decided that

issued to give employers notice of the

guidance and to give them an opportunity to comment along with
other members of the public and Federal agencies.

Since guide-

lines are regularly published in the Federal Register for public
notice and comment

and~are

also regularly circulated to Federal

agencies for comment, this format appeared to be the vehicle
which would best serve the interests of all concerned.

On April 11, 1980, the interim guidelines were published in
the Federal Register for a 60 day period for public comment. In
addition to the comments received from Federal agencies, the
Commission received 168 letters in response to this publication.
These comments came from persons throughout
sectors.

th~

public and private

The single most prevalent group of comments

to~k

the

form of praise for the Commission for publishing guidelines on
the issue of sexual harassment and for the
lines.

c~nt'ent

of the guide-

The Commission was gratified by this high degree of

favorable response which the guidelines elicited, recognizing
that this was an

~nusual

phenomenon in recent Federal experience.

The Final Guidelines were published in the,, Federal Register
November 10, 1980.

i.

I will discuss them now, sJction-by-section.

The first subsection of the guidelines states that sexual harassment is a violation of Titie VII and defines sexual harassment as
follows:
-3-

Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition
of an individual's

employmen~

(2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting
such indiviudal, or (3) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work
perfo~nce

or creating an

intimidating~

hostile, or offensive working environment.

A number of persons who responded t9 the publication of the
guidelines suggested that this definition of sexual harassment
should be more specific both as a general proposition and as a
means for strengthening the guidelines, particularly-with regard
to §1604.l1(a) (3),· the section which provides that, "Unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitu;e harassment

i.

when ... such conduct- has the purpose or effect bf unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."

-~-

These comments

wer~

carefully considered by the Commission, and

after much consideration, the Commission decided that the definition should stand as written, with one word changed for the sake
of clarity.

This conclusion was based on two factors.

First,

the Commission has held in its decisions that this definition is
applicable in cases of harassment based on national origin, race,
and religion, since 1968, 1969, and 1971, respectively 4/, and
the courts have also recognized this form of harassment as discriminatory.~1

At this time, the Commission sees no justification

for treating harassment based on sex any differently than harassment
based on race, religion, color; or national origin, for we agree
with the following statement:' contained in the report of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare when Title VII was
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972:

If • • •

discrimination against women is no less serious than other prohibited forms of discrimination, and ... it is to be accorded the
same degree of concern given to any type of

sim~larly

unlawful

conduct."61 One court recognized this specific form of sexual
harassmen~

prior to the issuance of the guidelinesII, and at

least two courts have supported the definition since the guidelines were issued.8/

The second factor that played a part in

th~

Commission's

determination was the difficulty inherent in frLming a specific
definition which does not include behavior which is perfectly
accepta'ble social behavior and has no relevance at all to Title

VII.

This difficulty is due to the fact that
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~he

same actions

which, under one set of circumstances, would constitute sexual
harassment, might, under another set of circumstances, constitute
acceptable social behavior.

Also, this is a developing area of the

law, and the Commission wanted to give guidance without being so
definitive that the guidelines would require amendments with each new
development.

Rather, as stated in Subsection (b) of the guidelines, the

Commission will consider each case alleging sexual harassment on a
case-by-case basis and consider such factors as the nature of the
. alleged sexual advances and the context in which they occurred.

This

way the Commission will be able to issue and publish fact-specific
decisions and further clarify and refine the definition through examples
and discussion contained in the decisions.

Since the publication of the final guidelines in November 1980,
the Commission has issued five

decisions.~

I have instructed staff

to present additional decisions to the Commission for consideration
so as to provide additional guidance for the public.

These decisions

all speak to areas of the guidelines which the Commission considers
appropriate for further development or explanation through the kind of
discussion that is not possible in a set of guidelines but is necessary
to the resolution of an individual charge of discrimination.

The

Commission feels that well developed, fact-specific decisions are the
appropriate vehicles for further refining the defipition of sexual
!

;

harassment.

-

6 -

:!:
common law
I

The

gui~_~ines

follow the well

standard of respondeat superior.

est_~lished

That is, they state that an

employer is responsible for the acts of its supervisors and
agents.

This responsibility exists regardless of the existence

of circumstances which would be mitigating factors if the person
who committed the acts were not a supervisor or an agent, e.g.
lack of knowledge of the acts on the part of the employer or
publication of a policy prohibiting the acts.

This is the

standard which the courts have previously applied in all area·s of
Title VII law.

It is true that some courts failed to apply this

standard in sexual harassment cases at the outset of the development of this legal issue; however, it should be noted that some
courts were initially slow to

g~ant

sexual harassment the same

legal status as other Title VII issues on any front.

MOreover, some courts did apply the respondeat superior
doctrine prior to the issuance of the guidelines.

For example,

one court stated in 1976, "For, if this (sexual harassment) was a
policy or practice of the plaintiff's supervisor, then it was the
(employer's) policy or practice, which is prohibited by Title
VII.nlO/

In other early sexual harassment cases the courts concluded
that, " ... respondeat·superior does apply here, phere the
action complained of was that of a supervisor, authorized to
.
hire, fire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in
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or recommer

such actions, even

thoug~

vhat the supervisor

is said to have done violates company policy"ll/ and that,
"Generally speaking, an employer is chargeable with Title
VII violations occasioned by discriminatory practices of
supervisory personnel. "l2l

The COlIDllents which dealt with

employer liability for acts of supervisors and agents were
read in conjunction with court precedent and Commission
policy in· this and all other areas of T.;,:tle VII law, and the
·Commission concluded that there was no justification for
distinguishing the issue of sexual harassment from other
Title VII issues.

The application of the principle of respondeat superior
in Title VII law is "far less onerous than in other areas of
law, such as tort law, because there are no provisions in
Title VII for punitive or compensatory damages, either as
money payable to the employee above and beyond that which is
actually lost or as fines.

This means that where an employer

knows of acts of sexual harassment which have been committed
by a supervisor or an agent and rectifies the actual results
of those actions, a further remedy under Title VII would be
unlikely in the administrative process.

Clearly, the Commission

would not sue for a remedy which has already been granted.

i

,f

Let me, at this point, EO back to the interim guidelines.
As originally published, Subsection (d) of the guidelines
provided that:

With respect to persons other than those
~.

\

mentioned in subsection (c) above, (that

is, supervisors and agents), an employer
is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer,
or its agents or supervisory employees,
knows or should have known of the conduct.

An employer may rebut apparent liability
for such aces by showing that it took
immediate and appropriate corrective action.

The comments we received showed that we needed to clarify what we
meant by our reference to "persons other than," and so we rewrote
Subsection (d) and limited it to cover liability for sexual
harassment by co-workers.

We retained the provision that sets

out the requirement for actual or constructive knowledge on the
part of employer "and the provision for a defense which consists
of a showing that the' employer took immediate and .appropriate
corrective action when it discovered the violation.

Then we

added a new Subsection (e) to cover actions by persons who do not
work for the employer, e.g., persons who regularly come to repair
equipment or make deliveries at an employer's facility and harass
an employee while they are on the employer's premises.

We also

retained the requirement in this subsection that employers have
knowledge before liability can vest and
for a defense consisting of a showing of
priate corrective action.

retaine~

I

the provision

~ediate

and appro-

In addition, we expanded the pro-

visions of the original subsection to state that, "i:'. reviewing

-9-

these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the
employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the
employer might have with respect to such non-employees." Clearly,
control is a given in the case of an employee, but is not necessarily present in the case of a non-employee and must be established in order to establish a violation.

However, where both

knowledge and control do exist on the part of the employer, there
is an obligation under Title VII for the employer to maintain an
atmosphere that is free of sexual harassment, so that members of
one sex are not required to work under different and less advantageous terms and conditions of employment than members of the
other sex.

In connection with these two subsections, some commentors
were concerned with what constitutes "appropriate corrective
action. 11

If the action is "corrective," that is, if it in fact

eliminates the illegal behavior, then it is appropriate; however,
actions

w~ich

result in the elimination of the illegal behavior

in one workplace might not have the same result in another workplace.

Since appropriateness will have to be determined on a

.

case-by-case basis, we did not make any changes,in the original

J

language.

-10-

Subsection (f

of the guidelines provide

that:

Prevention °is the best tool for the
ation of sexual harassment.

el~in-

An employer

should take all steps necessary to prevent
sexual harassment from occurring, such as
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing
strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing

emy~oyees

of their right

to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and developing methods
to sensitize all concerned.

This subsection contains the major thrust of the guidelines,
that is "Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of
sexual harassment."

The suggestions offered in this subsection

give employers assistance in preventing an invidious form of
discrimination that inflicts substantial psychological damage to
its victims, in addition to the monetary damage that it inflicts.
It is most important when considering the issue of sexual harassment that we bear this psychological damage in mind and recognize
that, while it is difficult to remedy, it can, in many cases, be
prevented. 13/
.

Some commentors requested greater specificity with respect
to the examples of preventative action which an employer might
take.

The Commission decided that it wr.;uld not go beyond making

the suggestions which were already set out in the guidelines. We
do not want to require that employers take previ"6usly determined
steps to prevent sexual harassment because the Commission feels

that each

wo~.~lace

is unique, and

step~

in one workplace might fail in another.

considered.

which might be effective
T~e

cost factor was also

extensive formalized training

An

progr~

might be

effective and appropriate in a large corporation, but a less
expensive, informal means of communicating the employer's concerns
to management and

th~

employees might be more efficient and

effective in a 'small business.

I have also made both the

Commissioners and staff available, within budget constraints, to
speak to trade associations and other employer and employee
groups to give

furt~er

examples and to discuss ideas which

members of the groups have for preventing sexual harassment.

Several people who submitted

\~itten

comments and a large

number of members of the public who telephoned the

Co~ission

. asked whether employees who are denied an employment benefit are·
covered by the guidelines when the benefit is received by a
person who is granting sexual favors to their mutual supervisor.
While we realize that this does not state a case of sexual
harassment, since we assume that the employee who received the
benefit is granting the sexual favors willingly and has not been
coerced into the

~elationship,

issue in the minds of the

it is obviously related to that

public~

Therefore, the Commission

decided to add a new subsection, Subsection (g), to the guidelines
to alert employers that this related issue is a~so covered by
Title VII.

This does not mean, and we did not state, that this

necessarily presents a vioiation of Title VII.
that the charge is cognizable

und~r

It merely means

Title VII and, if brought to

the Commission, will be decided under that statute.
-12-

It is important to understand that this provision affords
protection for persons who are not involved in the situation but
who, nevertheless, are adversely affected by the sexual conduct of
others.

Thus, it creates a balance of protection for all persons in

the workplace.

One criticism of the guidelines which was raised by a limited
number of commentors during the formal comment period but which has
been raised f·requently since the guidelines became final is that they
will cause an influx of frivolous charges at EEOC.

All charges that

are filed in our field offices which involve the issue of sexual harassment are investigated in the field and then sent in to Headquarters
for a decision on the merits by the Commission.

In April of this year I

instructed staff to read through all of the case files which were in
Headquarters and to give me a sense of the contents of those case files.
The following is the result of their reading.

At that time there were 130 sexual harassment charges in Headquarters.

Of these, 118 contained corroborative evidence that

substantiated part, if not all, of the Charging Party's allegations.
The evidence came in the forms 0f admissions by Respondent, statements
of people who witnessed the sexual advances, statements of others
subjected to the same or similar conduct as

Chargin~

i

t

statements of corroboration.
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Party, and other

These cases, which are

decided on the merits, cover a wide

range of activity as demonstrated by the following: fifty-eight of
these charges involved unwelcome physical contact of a sexual nature,
such as the touching of a person's buttocks or hugging or kissing;
seventy-seven involved demands for a person to engage in a sexual
act and the promise of a favorable employment decision if the demand
is met or the threat of a negative action if the demand is not met;
and twenty-six involved the use of vulgar language of a sexual nature,
calling a person sexually derogatory names, making sexually derogatory
comments about one sex, or displaying sexually explicit pictures,
photographs, or cartoons.

From another point of analysis,

sev~nty-one

of the charges were

brought by women who.were fired; twenty-six were brought by women
who resigned when the unwelcomed sexual activity became intolerable;
nineteen were brought by women who either were given less desirable
work assignments, had their number of hours of work reduced, or were
transfered to a different work shift; seven were brought by women
who were denied a promotion; and seven were brought by women who were
subjected to sexual activity which interfered with their work
performance or created an offensive working environment •.

In the 118 charges which were corroborated, ~e acts of sexual
harassment were perpetrated by supervisors or other management officials
in 106 cases and by coworkers in 12 cases.
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In conclusion, sexual harassment in the workplace is not a
figment of the imagination.

It is a real problem. The sexual

harassment guidelines are designed to assist employers in their
understanding of this sensitive public issue and to guide them in
developing management training programs for their companies, and
the Federal government.

T~ank

-15-

you.
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